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Abstract
This section deals with the issues of business continuity and recovery after disasters. The
authors analyzed standards, laws, and regulations pertaining to the parameters of peri-
odic monitoring and recovery in information systems. This section includes mathematical
models of resources and environment periodic monitoring as well as periodic backup and
recovery after interruptions or disasters. The work demonstrates that the well-known
deterministic periodic monitoring and backup models do not take into account stochastic
peculiarities of ergatic systems to the full extent. The authors developed new stochastic
models of restricted monitoring and backup that allow taking into consideration resources
constrains and random factors of information systems operation. The notion of Bernoulli
stream has been introduced. This section suggests the criteria for selecting deterministic or
stochastic monitoring and backup models and their combinations. A solution of direct
and reverse task of the calculation of control and monitoring procedures frequency is
offered. This section also provides a methodology for information system stability man-
agement, considering periodic monitoring, rollback, and recovery in case of interruption.
Keywords: business continuity, backup, rollback, recovery, regular procedures, limited
stochastic control, Bernoulli flow, stochastic models, deterministic models, periodic
inspection, stochastic redundancy
1. Introduction
Basic business continuity planning and disaster recovery procedures include periodic moni-
toring (control) of resource integrity and periodic backup [1–4].
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Requirements for periodic monitoring and backup established by current regulatory docu-
ments are briefly described subsequently.
2. Parameters of periodic monitoring and recovery in information systems
2.1. Periodic monitoring parameters
The main parameters of periodic monitoring and recovery in protected information systems
(ISs) are provided as follows:
• frequency of monitoring (internal monitoring) of security functions operability of infor-
mation security controls used in the information systems;
• frequency of external (external audit) of security functions operability of information
security controls applied in the information systems; and
• update frequency of the information system parameters and characteristics relating to the
information security (change of passwords, update of the information security controls
decision rules or signatures).
The results of completed analysis are shown in Table 1.
Name of document Frequency of
internal
monitoring
Frequency of
external
monitoring
Frequency of
parameters
update
ISA 62443–3-3:2013 + + +
ISO/IEC 27001:2013/ISO/IEC 27002:2013 + + +
PCI DSS + (6 months) + (6 months) + (90 days)
Australian Government Information Security Manual.
Controls1 (Australia)
+ + + (90 days)
The IT-Grundschutz Catalogs2 (Germany) + + +
Cyber Essentials Scheme Requirements for basic technical
protection from cyber attacks3 (Great Britain)
— — +
Information Security Provisions in Federal Information
Systems4 (Russia)
+ + + (180, 120, 90, and
60 days)
Requirements for Information Security in Process Control
Systems (Russia)
+ + + (180, 120, 90, and
60 days)
NIST SP 800–535/NIST SP 800-63B6 (USA) + + +
1https://www.asd.gov.au/publications/Information_Security_Manual_2017_Controls.pdf
2https://download.gsb.bund.de/BSI/ITGSKEN/IT-GSK-13-EL-en-all_v940.pdf
3https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/647,619/requirements_archived.pdf
4http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf
5https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4
6http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf
Table 1. Requirements for the periodicity of control.
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2.2. Periodic backup parameters
In practice [1, 2, 4, 5], the main parameter defining the frequency of periodic information
backup is the recovery point objective (RPO)—the maximum period of data loss occurring
due to an information security incident. The value recovery time objective (RTO) is the period
of the information system unavailability in case of the information security incident. The value
of RPO defines the backup frequency (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Diagram of the system operation and incident recovery.
Document name Requirements for
periodic backup
Quantitative values or
calculation formulae
ISA 62443–3-3:2013 + —
ISO/IEC 15408 + —
ISO/IEC 27001:2013/ ISO/IEC 27002:2013 + —
Australian Government Information Security Manual Controls + +
The IT-Grundschutz Catalogs + —
Cyber Essentials Scheme Requirements for basic technical protection from
cyber attacks
— —
GOST R 56939 + —
Information Security Provisions in Federal Information Systems + —
Requirements for Information Security in Process Control Systems + —
NIST SP 800–53/NIST SP 800–34 + —
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity1 + —
1www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cyberframework/cybersecurity-framework-021214.pdf
Table 2. Requirements for backup frequency.
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The analytical review of regulatory documents and methodologies defining the requirements
for information security relating to periodic backup and recovery is shown in Table 2.
As the completed review shows (Tables 1 and 2), there are clear requirements for periodic
monitoring and backup though their main parameters are defined either by expert judgments
or by management order.
Considering high subjectivity of such decisions, it is reasonable to develop mathematical
models for the calculation of periodic monitoring and backup parameters.
3. Mathematical models of periodic monitoring and backup
As noted earlier, the basic mechanism for providing functional stability to information systems
(ISs) is systematic monitoring and backup against possible failures. There are two key
approaches to arranging monitoring in IS. The first one relates to the occurrence of a certain
event of the computation process (message processing, initiating an exchange among pro-
cesses, system program call, etc.) [6]. This approach’s drawbacks are the difficulty in identify-
ing a set of controlled events of the computation process and the potential for unlimited
growth of control points. The latter makes the approach hard to apply during IS normal
operation, given the specified resource and task-time restrictions.
The second approach involves a periodic check of the system at predetermined intervals
[7–10]. This is consistent with time schedules and allows the existing resource restrictions to
be taken into consideration, but fails to fully reflect the stochastic nature of the occurrence of
various errors and irregularities. Furthermore, a number of subjective factors make it impossi-
ble, in the first place, to organize periodic control in ergatic systems at strictly specified
intervals. There is another approach, however, that takes into account the stochastic external
factors of IS functional stability, given the specified time and economic constraints.
Under ISO/IEC 15408–1:2009,1 monitoring covers not only SW (assessment object) but also the
operational environment. Let us consider stochastic and deterministic models of the earlier
procedures.
3.1. Periodic resource monitoring models
Let us conditionally present the IS software (SW) operating process as alternating flows of errors
I(y), normal operation recovery I(z), failures I(Q), and SW/environment control (Figure 2).
Being mutually alternative, the flows of failures and normal system operation recovery result
from the flow of errors and are shifted with respect thereto by the values Q(t) and z(t). The
maximum of these values determines the manifestation of a respective flow. Assuming the
recovery time to be instantaneous, the normal operation recovery flow may be considered part
1
ISO/IEC 15408–1:2009: IT—security techniques—evaluation criteria for IT security.
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of the control flow. In this case, the task of providing SW functional stability comes down to
that of optimizing restricted control that meets the condition z(t) < Q(t).
Let us consider the SW life cycle period t, having regard to the conducted inspection control of
repeatable accuracy. Because the period t far exceeds the control time, let us assume the latter
to be instantaneous. Then, the SW repeatable accuracy is characterized by the probability
P(z^ <Q) = Fz^ (Q) that the irregularity/vulnerability/error detection time z^ within the inter-
control interval is not longer than the permissible SW life cycle period Q, where there is an
irregularity. A periodic control fragment is shown in Figure 3.
Let us consider the flow of irregularities (errors and vulnerabilities) to be the simplest one with
the density of interval y^ distribution among them:
gy^ ¼ λe
λy (1)
where λ is the intensity of irregularities.
Let us define a stochastic model for the detection of irregularities. In this case, control is under-
taken a certain number of times with equal probability and independently of one another. Thus,
the limited flow formed by all the control points is Bernoulli’s flowwith the density of interval T^
distribution among the control points [11]:
Figure 2. Flows of errors, failures, recovery, and control.
Figure 3. A fragment of the inspection control of an information security tool.
Periodic Monitoring and Recovery of Resources in Information Systems
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75232
217
f T^ ¼ n=t 1 T=tð Þ
n1 (2)
where n is the number of control points.
The delay time z^ = T^  y^ is a function of two stochastic variables and has the following
distribution function:
Fsz^ ¼
ðð
Sð Þ
n
t 1 Tt
 n1 λeλydTdy; t > 0; n > 0ð Þ (3)
Having defined the integration limit (Figure 4), we obtain the following:
Fsz^ ¼
ðtz
0
ðyþz
y
n=t 1 T=tð Þn1 λeλydT
 !
dyþ
ðt
tz
ðt
y
n=t 1 T=tð Þn1 λeλydT
 !
dy (4)
After simplifying (Eq. (4)), we have the following formula:
Fsz^ ¼ λ=t
n
ðtz
0
eλy t yð Þn  t z yð Þnð Þdyþ
ðt
tz
eλy t yð Þnð Þdy
 
(5)
Having expanded the formula integrands as a power series, we obtain an approximate value
of the distribution function that is the basic computational ratio:
Fsz^ ¼ λ
Xn
i¼0
Xr
j¼0
Xnþjþ1
l¼1
1ð Þiþjþlþ1CinC
l
nþjþ1
λ
jtjþ1lzl
j! 1þ jþ ið Þ
(6)
where r is the number of iterations.
Figure 4. Domain of integrating the irregularity detection time delay interval.
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In order to compare stochastic and deterministic models, let us elaborate on the latter. The
deterministic model’s control points form a regular flow with a constant value of the interval
T = t/(n + 1) and the irregularity detection time distribution density:
gz^ ¼ λe
λ Tzð Þ; 0 < z < Tð Þ (7)
It can be shown that the expression for the distribution function in the deterministic model is
as follows:
Fdz^ ¼ e
λT eλz  1
 
; 0 < z < Tð Þ (8)
Comparison of the expressions for the models (Eqs. (4) and (8)) suggests that the models under
review conform to the process of detecting SW repeatable accuracy disturbances (at specified
values λ, Q, t, and n):
Fsz^ zð Þ≶F
d
z^ zð Þ (9)
The irregularity detection probability Pn for the SW life cycle period t can be presented as
follows:
Pn ¼ nþ 1ð Þ∙Fz^ (10)
where n is the number of inspection control points (n > 0), Fz^ ¼ max F
s
z^ zð Þ; F
d
z^ zð Þ
 
.
A review of the models discussed earlier showed an advantage of the stochastic model, given a
small number of inspection control points. Conceptually, it can be accounted for by the fact
that even with a small number of random points of SW characteristics control, there is always a
likelihood that an irregularity is detected once it has occurred, whereas in the case of the
deterministic model, the inspection period may not be less than the specified value.
3.2. Operational environment periodic control model
The control of restrictions imposed on SW primarily involves inspecting SW environment and
operation/production conditions. Such inspections help rule out irregularities (errors, vulnera-
bilities) concerning the SW front-end interface. In this regard, the procedures for detecting
environment irregularities can be interpreted as a mechanism to prevent SW irregularities.
Environment control requirements are specified by ISO 15408 standards.
Let us consider IS operation where an SW error prevention mechanism is available.
When developing environment control models, we will adhere to the approach outlined in the
previous section. We will assume SW repeatable accuracy to be characterized by the probabil-
ity P z^ < Qð Þ ¼ Fz^ Qð Þ that the preliminary control z^ time between the environment control
point and a possible point of occurrence of SW characteristic disturbance does not exceed the
permissible time Q. Let us define a stochastic model of environment irregularity control
(Figure 5).
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It can be shown that the preliminary control time is a function of two random values z^ ¼ y^  T^
and has the following distribution function:
Fsz^ ¼
ðð
Sð Þ
n
t 1 Tt
 n1 λeλydTdy; t > 0; n > 0ð Þ (11)
where n is the number of environment control points and λ is the SW characteristic distur-
bance intensity.
Having defined integration limits (Figure 6) and simplified the expression, we obtain the
following:
Fsz^ ¼
ðz
0
f T^ Tð ÞeλT 1 eλT
 
dT þ
ðtz
z
f T^ Tð ÞeλT 1 eλz
 
dT þ
ðt
tz
f T^ Tð ÞeλTdT  eλt
z
t
 n
,
(12)
Having expanded the formula integrands as a power series, we obtain an approximate value
of the distribution function that is the basic computational ratio:
Figure 6. Domain of integrating the irregularity prevention time interval.
Figure 5. Operation of the system, with an irregularity error prevention mechanism available.
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Fsz^ ≈n
Xr
i¼0
Xn1
j¼0
b1b2
0
@
1
A eλt z
t
 n
; t > 0; n > 0ð Þ (13)
where r is the number of iterations; b1 ¼ 1ð Þ
iþjCin1
λ
j
j!tiþ1 iþjþ1ð Þð Þ
; b2 ¼ t
iþjþ1  ziþjþ1
2j  eλz
 
t zð Þiþjþ1 eλz.
Let us compare the obtained stochastic model and the deterministic one. The deterministic
model’s control points form a regular flow with a constant value of the interval T = t/(n + 1) and
the following preliminary control time distribution density:
gz^ ¼ λe
λ Tþzð Þ; 0 < z < Tð Þ (14)
Hence, the expression for the distribution function in the deterministic model will be as
follows:
Fdz^ ¼ e
λT 1 eλz
 
; 0 < z < Tð Þ (15)
By comparing computational model expressions at specified values λ, Q, t, and n, we obtain a
criterion to choose a model:
Fsz^ zð Þ≶F
d
z^ zð Þ (16)
The probability Pn of irregularity prevention for SW life cycle period t can be presented as
follows:
Pn ¼ nþ 1ð Þ∙Fz^ (17)
where n is the number of control points (n > 0), Fz^ ¼ max F
s
z^ zð Þ; F
d
z^ zð Þ
 
.
Comparative analysis of stochastic and deterministic models showed the former’s effective-
ness with a small number of control points. Therefore, when managing system information
security by numerical methods, it is possible to identify preferred models (stochastic, deter-
ministic, or combined) that bolster confidence in SW. This gives an effect akin to introducing
structure redundancy, that is, a special type of redundancy—stochastic—the use of which is
unlikely to result in higher costs [11].
An example of comparing deterministic and stochastic models is shown in Figure 7.
3.3. Periodic backup models
The previous subsections dealt with deterministic and stochastic SW control models. When
tackling comprehensive tasks of providing IS operational reliability and security, it is important
Periodic Monitoring and Recovery of Resources in Information Systems
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to ensure information safety in case of incidents. This can be achieved by developing an incident
management system.2
Apart from control models, this work also investigates backup and recovery models.
The backup mechanism is intended to recover a system’s normal operation in case of a failure
or an incident, such a recovery starting from the last backup time (Figure 8).
The backup mechanism control task boils down to developing a checkpoint (CP) setting model
that minimizes the mathematical expectation of the program operation delay time, given the
restrictions on the total SWoperation time and the number of CP. The issues of minimizing the
mathematical expectation of delay time by changing the CP setting frequency and the deter-
mined interval among checkpoints are discussed in [9].
Let us consider a situation when an interval is a random value.
If the failure flow of the computation process is regarded as simple, it can be shown that the
delay time z^ = y^  T^ is a function of two random values and has the following mathematical
expectation:
Figure 7. Irregularity prevention probability versus the number of preliminary control points.
Figure 8. Program operation using a checkpoint mechanism.
2
ISO/IEC TR 18044:2004 IT—security techniques—information security incident management.
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Msz^ ¼
ðð
Sð Þ
y Tð Þ
n
t
1
T
t
 n1
λeλydTdy; t > 0; n > 0ð Þ (18)
where n is the number of environment control points and λ is system’s failure intensity.
Having defined integration limits (Figure 9) and simplified the expression, we obtain the
following:
Msz^ ¼
ðt
0
n=t 1 T=tð Þn1
eλT
λ
dT 
ðt=2
0
n=t 1 T=tð Þn1 e2λT T þ
1
λ
 
dT  b1, (19)
where b1 ¼
eλt
2n (
1
λ
þ nt= 2nþ 2ð ÞÞ.
Having expanded the integrands as a power series, we obtain an approximate value of the
mathematical expectation of delay time:
Msz^ ≈n
Xn1
i¼0
Xr
j¼0
1ð ÞjþiCinþ1
λ
jtjb2
j!
 b1, (20)
where b2 ¼
1
λ iþjþ1ð Þð Þ
t
2iþ2 iþjþ2ð Þ
 1
2iþ1λ iþjþ1ð Þ
, r is the number of iterations.
In order to compare the obtained stochastic model (Eq. (20)) and the deterministic one, we
consider the latter in more detail. The deterministic model’s checkpoints form a regular flow with
a constant value of the interval T ¼ tnþ1. The delay time distribution density will be as follows:
gz^ ¼ λe
λ Tþzð Þ; 0 < z < Tð Þ: (21)
It can be shown that the expression for the mathematical expectation of delay time in the
deterministic model is as follows:
Figure 9. Domain of integrating the program operation delay time interval.
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Mdz^ ¼
eλT
λ
1 eλT λT þ 1ð Þ
 
; 0 < z < Tð Þ (22)
By comparing the expressions (Eqs. (20) and (22)), we obtain a criterion allowing a model to be
chosen at specific values λ, t, and n:
Msz^ zð Þ≶M
d
z^ zð Þ (23)
Considering the CP setting time and restart to be instantaneous, we obtain a total SW opera-
tion time model, given the availability of the CP mechanism:
t0 nð Þ ¼ tþ nþ 1ð ÞMz^ (24)
where t is the SWoperation time, n is the number of checkpoints, and Mz^ ¼ max M
s
z^ zð Þ;

Mdz^ zð ÞÞ
is the mathematical expectation of the SWoperation delay time in case of failure.
Here is an example using the department archive data for the first half of 2017. The database
(DB) was inspected seven times over this period. The inspections revealed 12 errors, all of
which were corrected by standard methods, with the relevant entry made in the administrator
log. The following error parameters were calculated:
• the average time between errors Mz^ = 43.83 h;
• the error intensity λ = 0.022 1/h;
• the average quadratic deviation δz^ = 30.04 h; and
• Cramér-von Mises criterion (goodness of fit) k(n) = 0.55.
Figure 10. DB error detection probabilities versus the number of control points.
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This allowed the error flow to be considered a stationary Poissonian flow. A study of the
electronic archive DB operation in 2000–2017 showed that the restriction on the correctable
error detection time Q was more than 1 month.
The DB recovery probabilities calculated by the formulas (Eqs. (20) and (22)) and their depen-
dence on the number of control points for the first half of 2010 (t = 1052 h) are shown in Figure 10.
Taking into account the electronic archive availability requirements, it is advisable to use only
three control points when applying the stochastic model (Table 3).
Thus, the practical solutions offered in this work allow for the stochastic nature of DB errors.
This permits the desired error detection model to be chosen at a specified DB and electronic
archive parameters.
4. System functional stability management
In general, IS periodic control involves performing a number of standard procedures:
• software error control;
• operational environment error control; and
• backup in case of failure.
Choosing a strategy and the number of control/backup points helps manage the system’s
stability, integrity, and accessibility levels [12]. For example, considering the earlier procedures,
one can define the system availability ratio (operational availability factor [13]):
R ¼
t
tþMrnr
 
0
@
1
A pþ 1 pð Þ Pene þ 1 Pene
 
Ppnp
  
(25)
where t is the task solution time,Mrnr is the mathematical expectation of the program operation
delay time in case of nr being the backup points, p is the SW error-free performance (SW
efficiency), Pene is the error prevention probability in case of ne environment control points,
and Ppnp is the error detection probability in case of np SW control points.
In the above formula, p is the SW failure-free performance probability; error prevention
probability—Pen = ne þ 1ð Þ∙Fz^; error detection probability—P
p
n = np þ 1
 
∙Fz^ ; availability
Control type Number of control points Man hours Recovery probability
Conventional 7 42 1.0
Deterministic 4 24 0.99996
Stochastic 3 18 0.99997
Table 3. An example of control parameter calculation results.
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factor R0 ¼ t
tþMrnrð Þ
 
; Mrnr ¼ tþ nr þ 1ð ÞMz^ .
The constraining factor (Eq. (25)) is the SW dependability cost index defined as the cost of
standard procedures:
C ne; np; nr
 
¼ Ce ne þ Cp np þ Cr nr (26)
where Cp is the cost of one SW error detection control event; Ce is the cost of one environment
control event for error prevention; and Cr is the cost of setting one checkpoint.
The SWoperation security management task comes down to optimizing the availability factor,
with the constraining factor (Eq. (26)). The following two optimization tasks can be defined:
1. Direct task: Using partial redundancy of the number of standard procedures, ensure that
the SW security index is at least equal to the specified index Rrg, with a minimum possible
cost of standard procedures in general, that is
min C ne; np; nr
 
j R ne; np; nr
 
> Rrg
 	
(27)
2. Reverse task: Using partial redundancy of the number of standard procedures, ensure that
the cost of all standard procedures does not exceed the specified value Crg, with a maxi-
mum possible SW reliability index, that is
max R ne; np; nr
 
j C ne; np; nr
 
< Crg
 	
(28)
4.1. Direct optimization task
Analysis (Eq. (25)) showed that R is a nondifferentiable monotone increasing function that is
strictly convex upward.
In order to solve optimization tasks, therefore, it is advisable to employ sequential search
methods.
Let us assume the value of incremental difference ∆R , nrð )/∆C to be an enumeration criterion.
Let us determine an enumeration step in accordance with the dichotomy rule. In this case, the
computational scheme for solving the direct task can be presented as follows:
1. Define a set of initial values of the number of standard procedures:
No = {n0
i, n0
j, n0
k}, where i,j,k E {e,p,r}.
2. Calculate the initial value R:
R0 = R(No).
3. If R0 > Rrg, perform the following operations:
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3.1. Find a set of search interval values
L0 = { L
i
0, L
j
0, L
k
0}, where L
l
0 = n
l
0 - n
l
lw; n
l
lw is the lower boundary n
l.
3.2. Obtain the set of possible values of the number of standard procedures
N1
i = {n1
i, n0
j, n0
k}, where n1
i ¼ n0
i  L0
i=2:


 


3.3. Find another set of values of the number of standard procedures
N1= N1
i, where i is the index of the standard procedure conforming to the minimization
condition:
minðR0 - R(N1
i)/(Ci L0
i=2


 

)), where i,j,k E {e,p,r}.
4. If R0 < Rrg, perform the following operations:
4.1. Find a set of search interval values
L0= { L
i
0, L
j
0, L
k
0}, where L
l
0 = n
l
u - n
l
0; n
l
u is the upper boundary n
l.
4.2. Obtain three sets of possible values of the number of standard procedures
N0
i = {n1
i, n0
j, n0
k}, where n1
i ¼ n0
i þ L0
i=2


 

.
4.3. Find another set of values of the number of standard procedures
N1= N1
i, where i is the index of the standard procedure conforming to the maximization
condition:
maxðR N1
i
 
 R0 - /(C
i L0
i=2


 

)), where i,j,k E {e,p,r}.
5. Increase the iteration index
τ ¼ τþ 1.
6. Calculate the value R
Rτ ¼ R Nτð Þ.
7. Find a set of search interval values
Lτ= { L
i
τ
, L
j
τ1, L
k
τ1}, where L
i
τ
¼ Li
τþ1=2


 

.
8. If R0 > Rrg, perform the following operations:
8.1. Obtain a set of possible values of the number of standard procedures
Nτ
i = {nτþ1
i,nτ
j, nτ
k}, where nτþ1
i ¼ nτ
i  Lτ
i=2


 

.
8.2. Find another set of values of the number of standard procedures
Nτ ¼ Nτþ1
i, where i is the index of the standard procedure conforming to the minimiza-
tion condition:
Periodic Monitoring and Recovery of Resources in Information Systems
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.75232
227
minðR0 - R(Nτþ1
i)/(Ci Li
τ
=2


 

)), where i,j,k E {e,p,r}.
If Nτþ1 ¼ Nτ1, withdraw from the procedure.
9. Otherwise (Rτ < Rrg), perform the following operations:
9.1. Obtain the set of possible values of the number of standard procedures:
Nτþ1
i = {nτþ1
i,nτ
j, nτ
k}, where nτþ1
i ¼ nτ
i þ Lτ
i=2


 

:
9.2. Find another set of values of the number of standard procedures
Nτþ1 ¼ Nτþ1
i, where i is the index of the standard procedure conforming to the maximi-
zation condition:
maxðR Nτþ1
i  R0
 
=(Ci Li
τ
=2


 

)), where i,j,k E {e,p,r}.
9.3. If Nτþ1 ¼ Nτ1, record the value Rτþ1 = R (Nτ1) and withdraw from the procedure.
10. Proceed to item 5.
The period of this computation scheme can be reduced as follows:
• by specifying the effective initial values, for example, by using personnel’s experience
(knowledge) or statistically accumulative tables;
• by reducing the calculation of standard procedure indices to their calculation only as per
deterministic models. This is acceptable with a great number of standard procedures
(more than 5–20) when stochastic models are less effective than deterministic ones.
4.2. Reverse optimization task
The reverse task can be solved using the branch-and-bound procedure. In this case, the
computation scheme will be as follows:
1. Specify a cost-ordered set N of initial values of the number of standard procedures
Nτ= {nτ
1,nτ
2, nτ
3}, C1 ≥C2 ≥C3,
which meets the normalization requirement:
0 ≤Crq -
P3
i¼1 n C
i
 
≤Ci; i ¼ 1; 3,
where τ is the ramification index;
2. Calculate the maximum value R by directed enumeration n2at the fixed value n1 ¼ n1r and
the initial value n2 ¼ n2r :
R Nτð Þ ¼ max Rð j n
1 ¼ n1
τ
Þ,
where Nτ meets the normalization requirement;
3. Calculate the maximum value R by directed enumeration n2at the fixed value n1 ¼ n1
τ
þ 1
and the initial value n2 ¼ n2
τ
:
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R Nτþ1ð Þ ¼ max Rð j n
1 ¼ n1
τ
þ 1Þ,
where Nτþ1 meets the normalization requirement;
4. Calculate the maximum value R by directed enumeration n2 at the fixed value n1 ¼ n1
τ
 1
and the initial value n2 ¼ n2
τ
:
R Nτ1ð Þ ¼ max Rð j n
1 ¼ n1
τ
 1Þ, where Nτ1 meets the normalization requirement;
5. If Rτ ¼ max Rτ1;Rτ;Rτþ1ð Þ, withdraw from the computation scheme;
6. If Rτþ1 ¼ max Rτ1;Rτ;Rτþ1ð Þ, let τ ¼ τþ 1, perform item 3 and proceed to item 5;
7. If Rτ1 ¼ max Rτ1;Rτ;Rτþ1ð Þ, let τ = 1 and proceed to item 4.
In practice, there may be a task of calculating indices not for the SW functional stability
(dependability) system in general but for a part thereof (checkpoint or error prevention/detec-
tion mechanisms). This means a transition from multidimensional to unidimensional task
interpretation, which helps substantially simplify computational procedures. Thus, solving a
partial reverse optimization task boils down to a single calculation of a specific index when
n ¼ Crq=C.
When solving a direct task, the effectiveness of the computation scheme can be additionally
improved by adjusting the variable change interval, for example, by defining the next variable
value in accordance with a distribution law, and so on.
5. Conclusion
Thus, in this section, we have considered stochastic and deterministic models of SW periodic
monitoring and backup, which allow for time and computational/data resource constraints.
Representing monitoring and backup points as a restricted Bernoulli’s flow helps obtain
random time intervals with the preset number thereof and, accordingly, allow for the effect of
stochastic external factors on the system operation process.
Comparative analysis of stochastic and deterministic models showed the former’s effective-
ness with a small number of control and backup points. Therefore, when managing IS
stability by numerical methods, it is possible to identify preferred models (stochastic, deter-
ministic, or combined) which enhance IS functional stability. This gives an effect akin to
introducing structure redundancy, that is, a special type of redundancy (stochastic), the use
of which is unlikely to result in higher costs. The application of stochastic models in engi-
neering systems can be facilitated by using a random-impulse generator that forms random-
restricted Bernoulli’s flows [11].
A similar approach was taken as a basis to solve the problem of efficiency assessment of the
diagnostic mechanism for data array failures. Apart from the IS resource control and backup
domain, the above-stated results can be of use in assessing the cost-effectiveness of control
measures andmechanisms being implemented in various engineering andmanagement systems.
For better use of stochastic models, it is possible to use a random pulse generator (e.g., [14]).
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